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In The S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STE'PHEN FRANK HYDE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
LAURI LEE HYDE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEP 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11463 
This is a divorce action by respondent, Steven Frank 
Hyde, (hereinafter referred t0 as "plaintiff"), against appel-
lant, Lauri Lee Hyde, (hereina:fter referred to as "de-
fendant"), involving the custody of the rninor daughter of 
the parties, Shelice Hyde, age two years. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Upon the evidence presented at trial, the trial court 
decreed that the plaintiff he granted a divorce from the de-
fendant and that the plaintiff be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the minor daughter of the parties, subject 
to reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant. Subse· 
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quent to the entry of the decree, the defendant made mo-
tion fo.r a new trial and to amend the findings. Pursuant to 
defendant'·s tnotfon and the hearing thereon, the trial court 
denied the motion for a new trial but ordered that the de-
cree of divorce should be amended to grant defendant reas-
onable and liberal rights of visitation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks a reversal of the decree in so far 
as it grants custody of the minor child of the parties to 
plaintiff and requests that custody be granted to defendant 
or in the alternative that a new trial be ordered as to the 
question of custody of the minor daughter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaint'iff and defendant were married at Centerville, 
Utah, February 25, 1966, and on the 20th day of September 
1966, a babYc daughter, Shelice Hyde, was b'orn as issue of 
the parties." 1~ediately following the marriage, plaintiff 
and defendant moved to Logan, Utah, for a short time while 
the plaintiff completed the academic quarter at Utah State 
University. The parties then moved to Centerville, Utah, 
where they resided for a brief period with defendant's par-o: 7Mt.:.") 
ents and then moved into a house in Centerville.1°0n Novem-
ber 2, 1967, as a consequem::e of conflict and emotional stress 
between defendant and plaintiff, and having arranged with 
her mother to care for the child in her absence, defendant 
traveled to Phoenix, Arizona for the purpose,, ,pf rest and 
(, 141.s) 
reassessment of her relationship to plaintif'f.A While there 
she received psychi1atric therapy from psychiatrist John H. 
Jarvis, M.D. U ~ .. + 11 ) 
l 
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During the time that defendant was in Phoenix, Ari-
zona, the baby daughter of the partie's was cared for by 
the defendant's mother in her home with assistance from 
(f{; <f ,L? ,.,'/I 
plaintiff.10n or'a:bout the 9th day of January, 1968, plain-
tiff filed an action for divorce against defendant on the 
grounds of mE:ntal cruelty and asked for custody of the 
baby daughter of the parties. The parties discussed the 
matter for some time and when it bec1ame apparent th'at the 
problems of the marriage and the custody of 'the baby daugh-
ter could not be amicably resolved, defendant retained coun-
sel and began legal action to obtain custody of her child. 
If; 3) 
On March 25, 1968, a motion for order granting defend-
ant temporary custody of the child was filed. A hearing on 
that motion which required testimony c'ould not be scheduled 
by the trial court for hearing until April 23, 1968. At that 
time defendant presented argument and a memorandum in 
support of her motion for temporary custody. Pl·aintiff was 
given ten days to file a memorandum of authorities and the 
court ordered that plaintiff have cu st o d y of the 
minor child until a decision was rendered. Because of the 
trial court's heavy calendar, defendant's motion could not 
be rescheduled to be heard until June 17, 1968. On that day 
testimony of defendant and Dr. John H. Jarvis was heard 
by the c'ourt, but the matter was not concluded. Counsel 
for defendant pointed out that a temporary order granted 
custody to the plaintiff during the proceedings and urged 
that the matter be concluded as rapidly as po'ss~"le. The 
trial judge stated that a hearing would be set in the im-
mediate future, (R. 7 at p. 58), but the next available time 
on the c'ourt's schedule was three months la'ter, September 
10, 1968, at which time defendant testified as did plaintiff 
and Dr. Edmund C. Evans. 
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After 'all evidence was in, the court granted plaintiff 
a divorce, took the matter of custody under advisement and 
on September 13, 1968, ruled that defendant was not a fit 
and proper person to be awarded the care and control of the 
7 f- r"l J 
minor child.< On September 24, 1968, the court signed the 
decree of divorce and defendant filed a motion for new trial 
on October 2, 1968. The trial court heard arguments of coun-
sel on October 15, 1968, took the motion under advisement 
l( ,,, 
and on November 29, 1968, ruled denying the motion.~There-
upon defendant, on December 17, 1968, filed a notice of ap-
peal. The court reporter, because of his heavy workload, 
was unable to prepare the transcript until February 20, 1969, 
and an order was signed granting an extension of time for 
filing the record on appeal. The record on appeal was filed 
on February 20, 1969. 
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be reversed and cus-
tody granted 1to defendant upon the following grounds: 
1. The evidence f'ail'S to support the following findings 
of the trial court : 
(a) The defendant is not a fit and proper person 
to have the c'are, custody and control of the minor 
child of the parties. (R. 9) 
(b) [The defendant] in other ways demonstrated 
that she is not able to care for 'the child and is not 
a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and 
control of the child. (R. 9) 
(c) The defendant i's suffering from a great emo-
tional instability. (R. 9) 
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( d) [The defendant's] absenting herself from the 
home was not for the welfare of the child, but 'for 
her fear of her inadequacies. (R. 9) 
( e) That it is for the best interest of the child that 
the child remain with the father and be placed in 
his care, custody and c'ontrol. (R. 9) 
(f) The "demonstrated stability" of the father war-
rants that the child remain with the father and be 
pl'aced in his care, custody and control. (R. 9) 
2. The evidence presented at trial indicates that the 
defendant is a fit and proper person to receive the care, 
cus'tody and contro'l of the minor daughter of the parties. 
3. The tdal court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion for a new 'trial on the basis that the findings failed to 
conform to the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I 
PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
DEFENDANT IS AN UNFIT MOTHE'R AND PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO MEET THIS BURDEN. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the univer-
sally reC'ognized presumption that it is for t<he bes't interest 
and welfare of 'a child of tender years to be wi'th her mother 
and the mother's right to custody should not be denied un-
less it is shown that she is such an immoral, incompetent or 
otherwise improper person that it would be contr1ary to the 
child's best interest and welfare to be in her custody. 
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1964); 
Ryan v. Ryan, 17 Utah 2d 44, 404 P.2d 247 (1965); Chase v. 
6 
Chase, 15 Utah 2d 81, 387 P.2d 556 (1963); Steiger v. Steiger, 
4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956); Briggs v. Briggs, 111 
Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223 (1947). 
The a'bove cited cases repeat the position that a pre-
sumption exists tlhat the best interest and weHare of a child 
of tender years is served by awarding custody to the mother, 
and the fat:iher has the burden of proving that the mother 
is not a fit and proper person to be given custody of the 
child. 
The first consideration, therefore, is whether or not 
phintif'f overcame the presumption that exists in defend-
ant's favor and proved that she is an unfit mother. 
Plaintiff called Dr. Edmund C. Evans, the pediatrician 
who cared for the minor child. He testified that he had cared 
for the child since her birth and had seen plaintiff and 
defendant on many occasions when they brought the baby 
in for regular visits. He testified that both parents are fine 
young people who have the poten'tial of practically any-
thing they would care to aim at and accomplish. (R. 6 at p. 7) 
He further testified that both plaintiff and defendant have 
great strength of character and tha't either one 'of them could 
be an excellent parent of their child. (R. 6 at p. 7) 
Dr. Evans further testified that since returning from 
Arizona, defendant has equipped herself 'to make a living 
independently, projected her plans for the future and re-
established her relationship with her parents. (R. 6 at p. 7) 
The best '1!hat can be said for the testimony of Dr. Evans 
is that he believes defendant's performance of her capabili-
ties over a ten rnonth period was poor and that the sort of ill-
ness he "suspects" she has is not easily cured. (R. 6 at p. 7, 8) 
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Nothing could be more vague. He did not state what 
defendant had done or had failed to do as a mother, did not 
say she didn't adequately care for the child but only that in 
his opinion her performance was below her capabilities. (R. 6 
at p. 7) 
As to Dr. Evans' testimony relative to defendant's so 
called illness it is important to note that this witness is not 
trained in psychiatry but in pediatrics and that 'the trained 
psychiatrist, Dr. John Jarvis, testified that defendant is cap-
able of appropriately and wisely caring for her child and 
that she is a very healthy person, vital and quite capable 
of warmth and understanding. (R. 6 at p. 25) He further 
testified that she has no disorder of thought but had been 
dis'traugh't and quite anxious as a result of her being 
estranged from her husband and parents. (R. 7 at p. 23) 
Looking at the evidence produced by plaintiff through 
Dr. Evans, no unfitness was revealed and nothing wa:s in-
troduced to show the best interest O'f the child would not 
be best served by granting defendant cus'tody. 
The only other direct evidence introduced by plaintiff 
was his own testimony. He, more than 'anyone, would be 
aware of defendant's conduct, if any, th'at would show her 
lack of fitness as a mother. Careful reading of plaintiff's 
testimony reveals that no statement is made showing de-
fendant did not properly care for the child and on cro,ss 
examination, plainti'ff substantiated defendant's testimony 
to the effect that her trip to Phoenix was 'thoroughly dis-
cussed and agreed upon and plans for the care of the child 
were made before the defendant left. (R. 7 at p. 123, 124) 
By comparison, in Briggs v. Briggs, supra, the mother 
didn't get along with the children, went out with friends 
8 
and left the children with the father, became angry easily 
and on three or four occasions whipped the children on ac-
count of disobedience-custody award to the mother up-
held; in Steiger v. Steiger, supra, the evidence was that the 
mother drank intoxicating liquors, had frequently been seen 
with other men and was not a g·ood housekeeper-custody 
award to the father reversed; in Dearden v. Dearden, supra, 
the proof showed that the mother had committed adultery, 
the court held that this alone did not show unfitness -
custody award to mother upheld; in Stuber v. Stuber, 121 
Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952) the mother cou'ldn't care for 
the child immediately but the grandrnother could do so 
and the mother lived with a man whom she intended to 
marry-·custody award to mother upheld. 
Looking at the evidence produced by plaintiff in the 
cross ex•arnination of defendant, the record, while not clear, 
indkates she was out of the home in the presence of another 
man just prior to her trip to Arizona (R. 7 a:t p. 96), also 
that she went to dinner with other fellows who lived in 
the same apartment building in Phoenix. (R. 7 at p. 100) 
Further, she do·es not deny dating men after her return to 
Salt Lake during the period of separation, but such dating 
oC'turred only during hours when the biaby was asleep. (R. 7 
at p. 102) 
The above C'onduct on the part of defendant, when 
viewed again'st the background of the conflict 'and break-
down of communicat'ions between the parties, appears to be 
an outgrowth of the conflict. There is no testimony to the 
effect that thi·s conduct harmed the welfare and proper de-
vel•opment of her child nor rendered defendant an unfit 
mother incapable of providing and caring for the welfare 
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and interests of her child. This evidence is insufficient to 
deprive defendant of the custody of her daughter under the 
moral standc:rds 0 1f our community and under the decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court, specifically the C'ase of Smith v. 
Smith, 9 Utah 2d 157, 340 P.2d 419 (1959) wherein Justice 
Henroid stated: 
There is no evidence that plaintiff was immoral or 
indiscreet in the presence or sight of her children, 
unless it be immorality or indiscretion to permit an-
other man to visit her after t'he marriage for all in-
tents ·and purpose was an impotent and ended cir-
cumstance. We think such visitation without any 
further evidence of any indiscretion indulged in the 
presence or sight of her children, cann·ot brand her 
as being an unfit mother to have the custody of her 
own children, and absent such evidence, the pre-
sumption that she was a fit and proper person calls 
upon us to send this case back with instructions to 
enter a 'finding of fact to the eHect that plaintiff 
here is a fit and proper person to have custody 
under the conditions of the decree a:s we have con-
strued i1t. Such is the order. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE 
ISSUE OF CUSTODY. 
The trial court found that defendant left the child in 
the custody and control of the plaintiif'f and absented her-
self for five months and as a result thereof is an unfit 
mother. 
Defendant testified that bef'ore leaving for Arizona she 
and plainti'ff 'thoroughly discussed her leaving and arranged 
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for the proper care o{ the child in her absence. (R. 7 at p. 4, 
S, 73) Plaintiff also testified that arrangements for the care 
of the child had been discussed before defendant left. (R. 7 
at p. 123, 124) 
The trip to Arizona was not an impulsive act by 
defendant without regard for the welfare of her child but 
an agreed course of action designed to solve a problem. Hav-
ing struggled with the conflict with her husband for some 
time with little apparent success in resolving the conflict, it 
appears log;_cal that defendant would consider a vacation 
from the situation for the purpose of gaining perspective 
and insight into the marriage problems. In so doing, as pre-
viously noted, defendant made arrangements for the care 
of her child in her absence. Defendant's testimony shows 
that she had s'ome degree of sophistication and insigh't into 
the conflicts which enveloped her by reason of her making a 
rational 'approach to solving tlhese conflicts and putting her-
se'1f in a better position to care for the needs of her child. 
(R. 7 at p. 5, SS) Based on the effect which the stay in Ari-
zona had on defendant, it appears that the long range wel-
fare interests of the minor child were not obstructed but in 
reality enhanced by the defendant's stay and therapy in Ari-
zona. (R. 6 a:t p. 11, 107) 
This stay in Arizona was clearly the culmination of 
frustration experienced by defendant. This is not the situa-
tion where a mother, responsible for the welfare of her 
child, simply cannot be depended upon to be with her child 
to care for the child's needs, or the situation where a mother 
repeatedly leaves her child unattended for extended periods 
of 'time, nor is this the case where the mother has aban-
doned the child for a period of time without prior arrange-
1 J 
ments or without knowledge that the child is being properly 
cared for. None of these being the situation in this case, the 
trial court was not justified in depriving this infant child of 
the daily love and attention of her mother. 
The trial court found that the defendant in "other ways 
demonstrated that she is not able to care for the child .... " 
(R. 9) In reviewing the testimony of all witnesses, de-
fendant is unable to ascertain the "other ways" referred to 
in this finding. 
The trial court found that defendant is suffering from 
great emotional instability. (R. 9) This finding cannot be 
supported by the evidence. Quite to the contrary is the 
testimony of Dr. Jarvis and Dr. Evans that the defendant is 
capable of adequate'ly caring for the needs of her daughter. 
(R. 6 at p. 7, 12) (R. 7 at p. 25) 
The finding that defendant was fearful that she would 
receive the rejection of her own child relates solely to the 
period preceding her stay in Phoenix, Arizona. Again to the 
contrary, the testimony of the defendant indicates that fears 
of rejection once experienced by her had been overcome 
and that defendant, s'ince her return from Arizona, has been 
able to relate in a mature way to her parents, her child and 
others, (R. 7 at p. 108) and her testimony in this regard is 
substantiated by Dr. Jarvis (R. 7 at p. 25, 26) and Dr. E,vans 
(R. 6 at p. 7, 11, 12) 
The finding that it was in the best interest of the child 
for the father to have the child "bec'ause of the demon-
strated stability of the father" (R. 9) has no factual basis 
in the evidence. Other than the testimony o.f the plaintiff in-
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dicating that he is able to make arrangements for the care 
of the child during his absence, defendant finds no other 
evidence indicating the "demonstrated sta'bility o'f the 
father." In fact, the uncontroverted testirnony of defend'ant 
relating to the discussions of the parties with Mrs. Garrett, 
the marriage counselor, indicates that Mrs. Garrett recom-
mended that plaintiff seek psychological assistance from a 
professional person whic'h he failed 'to do. (R. 7 at p. 82, 132) 
Also, Dr. Evans testified that the plaintiff was somewhat 
rigid in his approach to relationships wit'h others and had 
some difficulty relating with women and girls. (R. 6 at p. 
10) 
Looking only a't the worst in defendant, the finding oif 
unfitness has no hasis, but the record also sets forth the 
love and affection she has for her daughter. Defendant testi-
fied and this testimony is uncontroverted, that she never 
yeUed or screamed at or hurt her daughter but did attempt 
to discipline the child. (R. 7 at 12). 
Defendant never left the baby without insuring that 
she was in C'apable hands, (R. 7 at p. 9, 10, 11) and her deep 
love and concern for the child was evident to Dr. Jarvis. 
(R. 7 at 19, 24, 26) 
Cases exi,st in this jurisdiction where,in custody of chil-
dren of tender ye'ars has been granted to the father but only 
where a clear showing of unfitness of the mother exists. 
In McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961 
(1963), the evidence was that the mother had committed in-
discretions wi'th other men, arrived home at early rnorning 
hours under the influence of alcohol rendering her unable to 
care for the child and her time away from home was spent 
in taverns and bars. It was also established that she had 
J 
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been prone to use unseemly language in the presence of the 
children and a number of salacious stories and other obscene 
materials were kept by her within easy reach oif the children. 
No such conduct can be imputed to the defendant herein. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118 
(1966), the father was awarded custody upon a showing 
among other things that the mother had taken a couple of 
safaris through several states with a girl friend and two 
"gentlemen." 
Here again, no such conduct can be imputed to de-
fendant herein. 
CONCLUSION 
In divorce cases, this court may review the evidence 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
if that is warranted, Dearden v. Dearden, supra, and the re-
versal of the tri'al court in this case is clearly warranted 
by the evidence: 
1. Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden, as established 
by this court, of showing that defendant's conduct is of 
such a nature as to hazard the welfare of the child and 
make it unwise that she be in her mother's custody. Dearden 
v. Dearden, supra. 
2. The findings of the trial court pertaining to the 
unfitness of defendant and the fitness of pl1aint'iff are not 
supported by the. e.viden·ce presented at trial; but to the 
contrary, the testimony of Dr. Evans and Dr. Jarvis, the 
only witnesses . other than the parties, clearly establish 
14 
that the deifendant is fit and fully capable of caring for the 
welfare and best interests of her daughter. 
3. The evidence indicates a true love and concern on 
the part of defendant for her infant daughter. 
The delays in the trial of this matter occasioned by the 
trial court schedule have been most unfortunate but should 
not 'in any way serve to deprive the infant child of the daily 
fove and attention of her mother inasmuch as defondant 
pushed the case along as rapidly as possible, and during the 
trial court proceedings and during the pendency of this 
appeal, deifendant has exercised her reasonable and liberal 
rights of visitation by keeping the child with her an aver·age 
of two full days, including overnight, each week. 
The defondant respectfully requests that the decision 
of the trial court pertaining to custody of the minor child 
be reversed and that custody be given to defendant subject 
to reasonable visitation rights to the plaintiff and further 
requests that the case be remanded for determination of a 
proper amount to be paid by plaintiff for the support of 
the child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. MATHESON 
THOMAS R. BLONQUIST 
of and for 
BURTON, BLONQUIST, 
CAHOON, MATHESON & 
SHAFFER 
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